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I
INTRODUCTION
I sense a certain segregationist spirit in the planning of this symposium. Not
only should equity be preserved, but it should be preserved separate and self-
conscious. In Delaware they do it right, with a separate court and a high-ranking
official called the Chancellor of Delaware. Chancellor Quillen described the
office as preserving "a touch of royalty to the judiciary."' Perhaps it was only
sound republican sensibilities that precluded calling this unique judge the Lord
High Chancellor of Delaware.2
Of course, Delaware is exceptional; most states have long since merged their
courts of law and equity. Most lawyers I meet are incredulous that anyone my
age ever taught a course in equity. But I once talked with a practitioner in
Mississippi who was incredulous that Illinois had a merged court system. He
said, "How does that work? I mean, do they just do everything together, all
mixed up?" Indeed they do, except in Cook County, which still has a Chancery
Division in its merged Circuit Court.
The segregationist spirit insists that even in a fully merged system, it is
important to preserve the separate traditions of equity, to think of equity as a
distinct body of law. It may be administered together with other bodies of law
in our modern merged court system, but we should always know when we are
invoking equity.
I dissent. My instincts are much more integrationist. The distinctive
traditions of equity now pervade the legal system. The war between law and
equity is over. Equity won. We should stop thinking of equity as separate and
marginal, as consisting of extraordinary remedies, supplemental doctrines, and
occasional exceptions, as special doctrines reserved for special occasions. Except
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where references to equity have been codified, as in the constitutional guarantees
of jury trial, we should consider it wholly irrelevant whether a remedy,
procedure, or doctrine originated at law or in equity. We should invoke equity
just as we invoke law, without explanation or apology and without a preliminary
showing that this is a case for equity. Our goal should not be separate courses
and conferences on equity, but rather, full recognition in all courses and all
conferences of those parts of the law that happen to come from equity.
Equity is ordinary, not extraordinary, in remedies, procedure, and substance.
Perhaps most important, the discretion once associated with equity now pervades
the legal system. To the extent that debate persists over discretion or other
features associated with equity, it is a general debate about the best way to run
a legal system. The debate is not about the boundary between law and equity,
and it distorts analysis to continue thinking in terms of law and equity.
Parts II through V support these claims by reviewing the contributions of
equity to remedies, procedure, and substantive law, and to our attitudes toward
discretion and formalism. Parts VI and VII turn to contemporary and future
debates that might be misinterpreted as a reaction against equity. I argue that
these are simply debates about the best way to run a legal system, and that they
no longer have anything to do with the law-equity distinction.
II
REMEDIES
Much of my scholarly work has been devoted to the claim that there is
nothing special about equitable remedies. The principal project began in a short
paper presented to the faculty colloquium series at the Duke University School
of Law. Eight years later, that short paper had grown into a book that collects,
reports, and synthesizes some 1400 injunction cases from every U.S. jurisdiction.3
I investigated the actual operation of the traditional rule that courts will not
grant an equitable remedy if a legal remedy would be adequate, or, in an
equivalent formulation, that equity will act only to prevent irreparable injury,
where "irreparable" means incapable of being repaired at law.4 I concluded that
this rule is dead, and that if we have to generalize about the choice of remedy,
we would do better to say that plaintiff is entitled to choose either specific or
substitutionary relief unless there is some articulable reason to override her
choice.
When I say that the irreparable injury rule is dead, I do not mean that judges
no longer talk about it in opinions. Rather, I mean that the rule is always
satisfied, so that it never constrains a court's decision in any case where the
3. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991) [hereinafter
IRREPARABLE INJURY]. For a shorter version with less documentation, see Douglas Laycock, The Death
of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REv. 687 (1990).
4. For a showing that the two formulations are equivalent, see IRREPARABLE INJURY, supra note
3, at 8-9, 25-27 nn.9-11.
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choice of remedy matters. In those cases where a court says the rule is not
satisfied, the court must ignore its main line of precedent about the meaning of
the rule. And in those cases, there is always some other reason to deny
equitable relief. I think that "dead" is the right word to describe the status of
such a rule, but my use of that word may have diverted the issue. An abstract
idea is only metaphorically alive in the first place; what does it mean to say it is
metaphorically dead?5 I do not want to spend the rest of my career debating
the metaphysics of a metaphor.
I will return to the question of what I meant by "death." But let me avoid
that question for a time, and begin by simply summarizing my research on the
law of remedies. I will emphasize what courts say when they choose to grant
equitable remedies. They sometimes say rather different things when they deny
equitable remedies, and this article discusses those cases. But, first, consider the
scope of the explanations courts give when they find legal remedies inadequate.
The reasons courts have given for holding legal remedies inadequate cover every
possible case in which the choice of remedy might matter.
The legal remedy is inadequate unless it is as complete, practical, and
efficient as the equitable remedy. This definition of adequacy is virtually
universal.6 Think about the implications of this definition. If the two remedies
differ in any way, and if plaintiff prefers the equitable remedy, he simply points
to the difference and notes that in that respect, the legal remedy is less complete,
less practical, or less efficient. If plaintiff cannot find such a difference, then for
all practical purposes, the remedies are the same. This definition of adequacy
requires no sacrifice from plaintiffs. We do not require plaintiff to accept a less-
than-ideal remedy just because the irreparable injury rule says he should.
The next most important specification of the irreparable injury rule is that
damages are inadequate unless they can be used to replace the very thing that
plaintiff lost. This means that courts never consider money an adequate remedy
in itself. Rather, the only adequate remedy is replacement of the loss in kind,
and money is adequate only if it can be used to obtain replacement in kind. This
rule is also virtually universal.7 Sometimes it appears in the guise of the rule
that damages are inadequate if they are too difficult to measure.8 Damages are
difficult to measure only when the thing plaintiff lost cannot be exactly replaced
in a market transaction.
Even where plaintiff can use money to replace her loss in kind, damages are
inadequate if replacement would be inconvenient. This rule is not universal; a
significant minority of cases holds that plaintiff must suffer the inconvenience of
5. One review of my book focused on this question. Gene R. Shreve, The Premature Burial of the
Irreparable Injury Rule, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1063, 1064-68 (1992) (book review).
6. IRREPARABLE INJURY, supra note 3, at 22-23, 35-36 nn.80-81.
7. Id. at 37-72.
8. Id. at 44-47, 66-71 nn.97-117.
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finding her own replacement. This minority line of cases is the principal remnant
of the irreparable injury rule.9
There are also narrower reasons for holding legal remedies inadequate: that
they would require a multiplicity of suits; that defendant is insolvent; that
defendant is immune from damages; that a damage action is not ripe, and that
plaintiff will be harmed by legal uncertainty in the interim; or even that plaintiff
will lose some tactical litigation advantage.1" The rule about multiplicity of suits
has a particularly important implication. One reason legal remedies might
require a multiplicity of suits is that damages are too small to deter repeated
violations." Thus, "irreparable" does not mean "serious"; to the contrary, an
injury that is trivial in monetary terms is for that reason an irreparable injury.
The only injury for which damages are an adequate remedy under these rules
is loss of fungible goods or routine services in an orderly market. Even in
litigation over goods, equitable remedies are far more common than the
conventional wisdom would suggest. Almost any aspect or quality of an item
sufficiently distinctive to motivate a demand for specific relief is also sufficient
to satisfy the irreparable injury rule. Specific performance has been granted to
recover a used crane, a better quality of toner, and carrots with red cores instead
of yellow. 2 Even perfect fungibility is irrelevant if the goods are in short
supply.1
3
Even if fungible replacements are readily available, replevin will lie to
recover the goods if plaintiff held a property right in the goods. That is, courts
also give specific relief at law without reference to the irreparable injury rule.
Thinking in historical categories of law and equity diverts attention from the
functional category of specific relief, which is not confined to equity. 4 There
is no anticipatory version of replevin; in theory, injunctions to prevent defendants
from converting or destroying goods are subject to the irreparable injury rule, so
an injunction should be denied if the goods are fungible. But most courts enjoin
threatened conversions and destruction of property without regard to the
irreparable injury rule. 5 Despite the rule, courts do not believe that I should
be allowed to steal or destroy your property so long as I can pay for it and you
can replace it.
As a practical matter, therefore, the irreparable injury rule limits plaintiff to
damages only in cases of breach of contract to deliver fungible goods or perform
routine services. Fungible goods is the classic category that we all learned in law
school, but fungible goods and routine services are categories of trifling
importance. If the market is really orderly and the goods or services are really
9. Both the majority and minority lines of cases are reviewed in id. at 42-44, 65-66 nn.86-96.
10. These sources of irreparable injury are reviewed in id. at 73-98.
11. Id. at 73-74.
12. Id. at 56 nn.37-41, 59 n.51.
13. Id. at 100-01, 107-08 nn.9-15.
14. For the significance of replevin and ejectment to understanding our remedial scheme, see id.
at 13-15, 18-19, 40-41, 59 n.57.
15. See id. at 40-41, 60 nn.61-62.
[Vol. 56: No. 3
THE TRIUMPH OF EQUITY
readily replaceable, plaintiff is unlikely to sue for injunction or specific
performance, and nothing important turns on the choice of remedy if he does.
The principal significance of this rule is that it gives rise to cases that are fairly
arguable when replacement is possible but inconvenient. These line-drawing
arguments lead to unnecessary litigation, occasional unjust results,16 and
difficulties with our civil law trading partners. It is hard to see the benefits.
Compare this narrow category of cases, where the traditional rule precludes
equitable relief, to the vast areas of the law where equitable remedies are
routine, standard, normal. Injunction or specific performance is the usual
remedy in all litigation relating to rights in real estate, including not just specific
performance of contracts to sell, but also specific performance of restrictive
covenants, condominium restrictions, and lease agreements, and injunctions
against encroachments, nuisances, continuous or repeated trespasses, interference
with easements, wrongful foreclosure of liens, violations of zoning laws, and
removal of timber, minerals, or lateral support. 7
Injunctions are routine in all environmental litigation, including litigation over
air and water pollution, endangered species and destruction of habitat, and
environmental impact statements." Injunctions are routine in all civil rights and
constitutional litigation, including litigation over discrimination, voting rights,
procedural rights, freedom of speech and religion, and threatened searches and
seizures.19
Injunctions are a routine remedy for misappropriation of trade secrets and
infringement of patents, copyrights, or trademarks." Injunctions are routine for
other business torts when the harm is not beyond the possibility of reversal-for
violations of antitrust laws and covenants not to compete, interference with
contract, and other sorts of unfair competition.21 Damages are inadequate for
any wrong that causes loss of profits, including breach of complex or long-term
contracts, because lost profits are hard to measure.22 But the routine recogni-
tion that damages are inadequate does not lead to routine specific performance,
because of countervailing concerns about the difficulty of supervising complex
or long-term contracts.23
Injunctions and specific performance are routine in litigation over the
ownership and control of business entities, including franchise agreements,
contracts to sell businesses or controlling blocks of stock, or even noncontrolling
16. See Sadat v. American Motors Corp., 470 N.E.2d 997 (IlI. 1984) (refusing to enforce statutory
right to refund or replacement after repeated failure to repair automobile); Wiles v. Wiles, 58 S.E.2d 601
(W. Va. 1950) (refusing to enjoin conversion and sale of plaintiff's personal property). For analysis of
the legal remedy in these cases, see IRREPARABLE INJURY, supra note 3, at 102-04.
17. See IRREPARABLE INJURY, supra note 3, at 37-39, 48-55 nn.1-33.
18. See id. at 41, 60 n.64, 63 nn.76-80.
19. See id. at 41, 60-63 nn.65-75.
20. See id. at 47, 68-70 nn.109-12.
21. See id. at 47-48, 70-72 nn.113-24.
22. See id. at 44-46, 66-68 nn.97-108.
23. See id. at 222-24, 232-36 nn.64-87.
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blocks of closely held stock,24 and in disputes over the rights and powers of
officers, directors, and shareholders.' The Delaware Chancery Court serves its
function as an expert forum for corporate law precisely because all significant
corporate litigation can be brought in equity. If equitable jurisdiction were really
extraordinary, the scheme would not work; the court's jurisdiction would have
to be redefined in terms of cases arising under the Delaware Corporation Act.
That has not been necessary because equity is not extraordinary.26 With little
doctrinal distortion, equitable jurisdiction can be made nearly universal in
corporate matters.
27
The set of cases where equitable remedies are routine is vastly larger and
more important than litigation over fungible goods and routine services in
orderly markets, the one modest area where equitable remedies are doctrinally
precluded.
The largest category of litigation in which damages are the routine remedy
is personal injury litigation. But the dominance of legal remedies here has
nothing to do with the separation of law and equity. Courts readily enjoin
conduct that threatens personal injury when there is opportunity to do so.28
But in most personal injury cases, the harm has already been irreversibly
suffered, and damages are the only possible remedy. The court has no choice of
remedies, and the irreparable injury rule is irrelevant. The irreparable injury
rule could matter only where some harm will accrue in the future, and the court
can choose between preventing the harm or letting it happen and awarding
damages. 2
9
Many other damage suits arise in similar circumstances: plaintiffs seek
damages for breach of contract, injury to land, harm to the environment,
violation of civil rights, securities fraud, antitrust violations, and business torts
when the harm has been done and can no longer be reversed, or when a self-
help remedy such as buying replacement goods, followed by a suit for damages,
24. See id. at 40, 56-57 nn.42-45.
25. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1278, 1288 (Del. 1988)
(enjoining improper defensive tactics in takeover fight, acknowledging irreparable injury requirement
but not explaining why it was met); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 184-
85 (Del. 1986) (perfunctory finding of irreparable injury); Getty Rfg. & Mktg. Co. v. Park Oil, Inc., 385
A.2d 147 (Del. Ch. 1978) (equity has jurisdiction over suits to pierce corporate veil).
26. The Court of Chancery has jurisdiction over "all matters and causes in equity." DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 341 (1975). It is specifically deprived of jurisdiction over "any matter wherein sufficient
remedy may be had by common law, or statute, before any other court or jurisdiction of this State." Id.
§ 342. There is no additional grant of jurisdiction in the General Corporation Act.
27. A case that successfully tested the limits is Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487 (Del.
1982), where damages were the only feasible remedy. The court held that a claim against corporate
management for fraud or breach of fiduciary duty falls within equity's substantive jurisdiction over fraud,
without regard to the adequacy of the legal remedy. Id. at 496-99. Alternatively, the court held that the
legal remedy was inadequate, because at law the plaintiff would have to prove intent to defraud, would
be limited to out-of-pocket damages, and could not sue on behalf of a class. Id. at 499-500.
28. See IRREPARABLE INJURY, supra note 3, at 41-42, 64-65 nn.81-85.
29. On the universe of cases in which choice is possible, see id. at 16-19, 30-33 nn.44-58.
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is quicker and more effective than specific performance or injunction. Very few
plaintiffs with a choice elect to suffer serious harm and then sue for damages.
Why do so many good lawyers continue to think of damages as the norm and
equitable remedies as extraordinary? I think it is because the large number of
routine cases in which damages are the only possible remedy seem to confirm the
traditional teaching. But the confirmation is only seeming; cases in which there
is no real choice of remedy reveal nothing about the rule or the practice in cases
where there is a choice. Where the facts permit a choice of remedy, there is
nothing extraordinary about equity. Modern U.S. judges have accepted the
equitable view that "a remedy which prevents a threatened wrong is in its
essential nature better than a remedy which permits the wrong to be done, and
then attempts to pay for it."3
Of course, there are cases that present a real choice among remedies, the
plaintiff asks for the equitable remedy, and the court denies it. Sometimes the
equitable remedy is more costly to the court or to the defendant; sometimes the
equitable remedy interferes with other policies in a way that the damage remedy
does not. Whenever a court denies an equitable remedy, it is likely to invoke
the irreparable injury rule and thereby perpetuate the myth that there is
something extraordinary about equitable remedies. But these cases almost never
depend on the irreparable injury rule or the extraordinariness of equity.
When I say that these cases do not depend on the irreparable injury rule, I
mean to assert two claims that are closely related but logically independent.
First, what courts say about irreparable injury in cases denying plaintiff's choice
of remedy is flatly inconsistent with what courts say about irreparable injury in
cases where injunctions are routinely granted; sometimes, courts denying
injunctions say things that are utter nonsense.3' Second, cases denying
plaintiff's choice of remedy can always be explained on the basis of some other
articulable reason for choosing the less adequate remedy on the facts of the
particular case. When a court awards damages for air pollution instead of
enjoining operation of a cement plant, it is not because damages are an adequate
remedy in pollution cases. It is not because equitable remedies are extraordinary
and require special justification. It is simply because, on the particular facts, it
would be unduly expensive to close the cement plant.32  The law-equity
distinction adds nothing to that explanation. Indeed, the same policy judgment
appears in cases where only damages are sought.33
30. 4 JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 1357, at 967 (5th ed. 1941). This statement survives intact from
Pomeroy's first edition. 3 id. at 389 (1883).
31. My favorite example is Willing v. Mazzocone, 393 A.2d 1155 (Pa. 1978), holding that a damage
judgment against an insolvent defendant is an adequate remedy for continuously repeated defamation,
even though the damages could neither be collected nor accurately measured.
32. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
33. See Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962) (refusing damages
based on cost of performance and awarding damages based on loss of value instead); see infra text
accompanying notes 105-07.
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By far the most common reason for denying plaintiffs choice of remedy is
that the case has not yet been tried. Preliminary relief is granted or denied
under a balancing test in which irreparable injury plays a prominent role.
Requests for preliminary relief-mostly preliminary injunctions, but also
temporary restraining orders and receiverships-account for seventy-five to
eighty percent of all West headnotes stating the irreparable injury rule.'
At Duke's Modem Equity symposium, Chancellor Allen said to me that
almost none of his cases get to final judgment-that he grants or denies the
preliminary injunction and then the case settles. It is therefore not surprising
that he thinks the irreparable injury rule is alive and well in his court. But the
survival of something like the irreparable injury rule at the preliminary injunction
stage implies nothing about my claim that the rule is dead at the final judgment
stage.
Note three things about the apparent survival of the irreparable injury rule
at the preliminary injunction stage. First, irreparable injury at the stage of
preliminary relief means something very different from irreparable injury at the
stage of permanent relief. The label is the same, but the rules are very different.
Injury that is obviously irreparable at final judgment is often not sufficiently
irreparable to justify a preliminary injunction.35 Second, the reason for this
restriction on preliminary relief is defendant's due process right to a full trial; this
reason has nothing to do with the distinction between law and equity. Third, the
policy against preliminary relief is by no means limited to equity; for reasons that
may be more historical than rational, the restriction on preliminary relief applies
much more stringently to damages and other legal relief. Preliminary damages
are so extraordinary that there is a virtually absolute prohibition against them,
no matter how great plaintiff's need.36 Preliminary injunctions are extraordi-
nary only in the limited sense that they require justification. What the
preliminary relief cases show is not that equitable remedies are extraordinary but
that preliminary remedies are extraordinary. Preliminary relief remains
extraordinary in Chancellor Allen's court even though his routine jurisdiction
over corporate matters is entirely derived from the routine nature of equity.
Defendant's right to due process is one of many real reasons for constraining
plaintiffs choice of remedy. In my book, I attempted to restate these real
reasons for decision without reference to the irreparable injury rule. The result
was seventeen proposed rules, beginning with a presumption in favor of the
plaintiff's preferred remedy.37 The other sixteen rules are exceptions dealing
with undue hardship, burden on innocent third parties, impracticality, personal
service contracts, prior restraints on speech, civil jury trial, equality among
creditors, interference with other authorities, interference with other law,
34. IRREPARABLE INJURY, supra note 3, at 110-11, 124-26 nn.6-9.
35. Id. at 113-17, 127-30 nn.18-36.
36. See Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Transformed: Preliminary Injunctions to Require the Payment
of Money, 70 B.U. L. REV. 623 (1990).
37. IRREPARABLE INJURY, supra note 3, at 265-76.
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ripeness, mootness, preliminary specific relief, coercive collection of money, sale
of fungible goods, preliminary substitutionary relief, and criminal procedure.38
Only the rule about protecting jury trial, where we are stuck with a law-equity
distinction in constitutional text, is stated in terms of law and equity.
My seventeen proposed rules synthesize the actual practice of courts; they
attempt to change explanations but not results. These proposed rules show that
the existing pattern of decisions can be explained by a rule that treats equity as
entirely normal, routine, nonextraordinary.
This next claim is more speculative, but I believe that my proposed rules
better fit the actual motivation of judges. When a judge is motivated to deny an
equitable remedy, she is likely to invoke the traditional rhetoric about the
extraordinary nature of equity. But a judge does not experience that motivation
every time she sees a request for an equitable remedy, or even most times. Most
requests for equitable remedies seem normal and appropriate. When a judge's
initial reaction is that the requested equitable remedy is appropriate, she will
ignore the irreparable injury rule or find it obviously satisfied. Judges do not in
fact view equitable remedies as extraordinary.
Indeed, judges sometimes comment on the ways in which specific relief is
simpler and less expensive to administer than damage remedies. Specific relief
is often simpler, but attempts to make sense of the irreparable injury rule
obscure that point. Specific relief reduces or eliminates consequential damages,
which is better for everyone: The plaintiff does not have to suffer them, the
lawyers do not have to litigate them, the court does not have to measure them,
and the defendant does not have to pay them. Thus, Judge Friendly wrote that
injunctions were "the appropriate remedy" in class actions, and that insurmount-
able difficulties came from the attempt to award damages.39 The Supreme
Court recently repeated its long-held view that injunctions ordering divestiture
are the "simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure" remedy in antitrust
merger cases.' That is not the conventional wisdom, but the Court is obviously
right that divestiture is easier than measuring damages from an anticompetitive
merger. The point is not limited to antitrust; specific performance of Pennzoil's
contract to acquire an interest in Getty would have been much simpler, and
vastly better for Texaco, than the complex damage litigation that actually
occurred.41
38. Id.
39. HENRY FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973).
40. California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 281 (1990) (quoting United States v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 331 (1961)). DuPont contains an essay on the routine nature of
divestiture. Id. at 326-31.
41. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). The Getty interests
breached their contract with Pennzoil and sold to Texaco at a higher price. A jury found Texaco liable
for tortious interference with contract and awarded $10.53 billion in compensatory and punitive damages.
For analysis of the choice of remedy, see Douglas Laycock, The Remedies Issues: Compensatory
Damages, Specific Performance, Punitive Damages, Supersedeas Bonds, and Abstention, 9 REV. LITIG.
473, 493-98 (1990).
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When Abram Chayes wrote that "the old sense of equitable remedies as
'extraordinary' has faded,"'42 he offered a tongue-in-cheek qualification: "It is
perhaps too soon to reverse the traditional maxim to read that money damages
will be awarded only when no suitable form of specific relief can be devised. 4 3
That time will never arrive, but only because he put the reversed maxim too
strongly. The issue is not whether specific relief is possible, but whether there
is some reason, other than the irreparable injury rule, to deny specific relief.
Except for the fungible goods cases, the old maxim can be reversed to this
extent: A plaintiff who requests specific relief will not be remitted to damages
unless there is some articulable reason to withhold specific relief
Let me return briefly to the question whether this means the irreparable
injury rule is dead. Gene Shreve dissents from this characterization in his
generous review of my book." Perhaps I should have hedged with a term such
as moribund, but this refinement would not have reduced Shreve's disagreement.
He is not merely quibbling with my use of a metaphor; he and I also disagree
over the meaning of the irreparable injury rule and the meaning of the cases.
Shreve reads my book as proving that "the rule is in robust (if undeserved) good
health. 45
The most striking thing about the Shreve review is that he has absolutely
nothing to say about the cases that grant injunctions.' The chapters reviewing
these cases are the heart of the book; the rest is incomprehensible without them.
These chapters document the routineness of equitable relief; they show that the
irreparable injury rule is dead by showing that it does not constrain the choice
of remedy. These chapters are like a controlled study: They show what
"irreparable injury" means to judges when the choice between law and equity is
constrained only by the irreparable injury rule and not by some other sufficient
reason to deny injunctive relief.
If you ignore the cases granting injunctions, you can treat any judicial
reference to the irreparable injury rule as evidence that the rule is still alive, as
Shreve apparently does. 47 But once you absorb the lesson of the cases granting
injunctions, it is difficult ever again to take the irreparable injury rule seriously.
The rule is always satisfied, and when a judge says that it is not, he is ignoring
clearly stated rules and vast quantities of precedent. When it also appears that
he has some other reason to deny the injunction, the only plausible inference is
that the other reason is the only reason, and that the reference to irreparable
injury is a makeweight that did not and could not motivate the decision.
42. Chayes, supra note *, at 1292.
43. Id.
44. Shreve, supra note 5, at 1062.
45. Id. at 1064.
46. These cases are summarized in supra text accompanying notes 6-27, and reviewed in chapters
2 and 3 of IRREPARABLE INJURY, supra note 3, at 37-98. Shreve cites pages in these chapters only twice,
once without comment for a definition of "irreparable," Shreve, supra note 5, at 1064 n.4, and once in
a collection of my citations to Shreve's earlier work, id. at 1072 n.52.
47. Shreve, supra note 5, at 1064-65.
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In Shreve's account, "the rule assigns injunctions an inferior place within a
remedial hierarchy by making them more difficult to obtain than damages. '
This is precisely what I deny. There is no remedial hierarchy, and injunctions
are not more difficult to obtain than damages. The existence of rules that
sometimes limit equitable relief, as when it is unduly expensive, does not show
a remedial hierarchy. Similar rules sometimes limit damages as well.
The most obvious restrictions on damages are immunity rules, and especially
those rules that make some defendants immune from damages but not immune
from injunctions.49 Damage remedies are also limited or precluded by rules
that make certain elements of damage noncompensable, even when clearly
suffered. Examples include the rule against recovery of economic losses in tort
in the absence of physical impact,5" the rules against consequential damages for
delay in payment of money51 or in eminent domain, 2 and the rule against
recovery for emotional distress caused by breach of contract. 3 Statutes often
limit tort damages to amounts that may be substantially less than the fact-finder's
valuation of damages actually suffered.54 Damages are cut off by statutes of
limitation and rules of proximate cause; injunctions sometimes ignore these
limits, most notably in the school desegregation cases. 5
Damages are sometimes effectively limited by the informal practice of judges
and lawyers, without the benefit of, or even in defiance of, the formal rules.
When I first presented to a faculty colloquium my thesis that the irreparable
injury rule was dead, Professor William Van Alstyne asked a converse question:
Why are there so few damage claims in civil rights and civil liberties cases? As
it happened, the very next day I had a chance to put that question to David
Goldberger, a tough and tenacious litigator who for many years ran the ACLU's
Chicago office. Goldberger said that causation and quantification of damages are
burdensome to litigate, that there is little prospect of substantial recovery, that
including a damage claim profoundly irritates the judge, and that he could
accomplish all his social policy goals by injunction. Consequently, he always
48. Id. at 1064.
49. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS (1983).
50. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985).
51. See, e.g., Meinrath v. Singer Co., 87 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
52. See, e.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984).
53. See, e.g., Dean v. Dean, 821 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1987).
54. See, e.g., Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989). Etheridge upheld
a $750,000 limit as applied to a $2.75 million verdict. Plaintiff was permanently confined to a nursing
home, with a life expectancy of 39.9 years; she claimed over $1.9 million in "economic loss," presumably
medical expenses and lost income. Id. at 527.
55. The school desegregation cases have sought to eliminate "vestiges" of discrimination that
sometimes occurred decades before the remedy. Neither laches nor statutes of limitations have ever
been applied. Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal,
86 COLUM. L. REv. 728, 733-34 (1986). I believe the first allusion to proximate cause in a school
desegregation case is in Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1446 (1992) ("[Tlhe district court may
determine that it will not order further remedies in the area of student assignments where racial
imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to constitutional violations.").
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tried to talk his clients out of asking for damages, and he thought this was a
widespread practice among civil liberties litigators.1
6
I think that Goldberger's account is still generally accurate, although the civil
rights bar has recently put more emphasis on damages in housing discrimination
and employment discrimination claims, where juries will sometimes award large
verdicts against corporate defendants.57  I am not aware of any similar
development in cases against public defendants, and I am confident that damages
against public defendants will somehow be confined to discrete incidents with
individual wrongdoers. For systemic violations of the Constitution, damages are
unthinkable and the injunction is de facto the exclusive remedy. For example,
I know of no case in which any plaintiff has recovered damages for an
unconstitutionally segregated education, and I am confident that judges faced
with a class action claiming such damages would find a way to deny it.
These formal and informal limitations on damages in problematic contexts
do not make damages an extraordinary remedy, and similar limitations on
equitable remedies in problematic contexts do not make equitable remedies
extraordinary either. The best summary of the law in practice is that either
damages or injunctions are presumptively available at the request of a successful
plaintiff, but that either will be denied if there is sufficient reason in a particular
case. If the irreparable injury rule means a hierarchy of remedies, and Shreve
and I agree that it does, then the irreparable injury rule is dead.
III
PROCEDURE
I am not a procedure scholar; here I must rely on others for details and
recent developments. But the main outlines of my claim are clear enough even
to a generalist. With the notable exception of jury trial, our procedural rules are
mostly derived from equity. Stephen Subrin reviews the history of this
derivation, and my title parallels his: How Equity Conquered Common Law. 8
Subrin treats the defining characteristics of common law procedure as the
jury, the writ system, and pleading to a single issue. 9 Only the jury survives.
The modem rules providing for a single form of action merge law and equity and
also abolish the last vestige of the writ system.' The modern concept of trans-
substantive procedure-a single form of complaint with substantially the same
procedural rules for any claim to relief-derives from the bill in equity. This
56. Personal conversation in Chicago, September 1983, summarized in letter from Douglas Laycock
to Thomas D. Rowe, Professor of Law, Duke University (Sept. 27, 1983) (on file with Law and
Contemporary Problems).
57. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 25.3(2), at
25-13 n.63 (1990) (collecting verdicts up to $65,000 and settlements up to $1.1 million).
58. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
59. Id. at 914.
60. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1-2.
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change is closely related to another: the rejection of technical pleading rules in
favor of simple, straightforward pleading, the extreme development of which was
captured in the phrase "notice pleading."'61 The pendulum has swung back a
bit from each of these developments. Carl Tobias argues that trans-substantive
procedure has been irretrievably eroded by an accumulation of special rules for
particular claims.62 Notice pleading has also been eroded,' most notably in
the implementation of Federal Rule 11' and in the lower court's demand for
greater specificity in pleading certain claims that have fallen out of judicial favor.
The Supreme Court has now rejected the notion that some claims may be
subjected to a "heightened pleading standard,"'65 although trial judges may
continue to read some pleadings more sympathetically than others regardless of
the doctrine. But any imaginable resolution of current controversies over
procedure will leave the pendulum far on the other side of the arc from common
law technicalities and the rule of pleading to a single issue.
Pleading to a single issue meant no joinder of claims or defenses, extraordi-
narily limited joinder of parties, and no pleading in the alternative. Equity took
the opposite position-that all interested parties should be joined so that
complete justice could be done in every case. The uninformative but suggestive
maxim was that "Equity delights to do justice and not by halves."'  Inability
to join all parties in a single case rendered the legal remedy inadequate; equity
would take jurisdiction to avoid a "multiplicity of suits." 67
Our modern pleading and joinder rules obviously build on the equity model:
related claims can be joined; counterclaims and cross claims can be added; any
party can plead in the alternative. Multiple parties with several claims and
defenses can be joined on both sides; third and fourth sides can be added
through impleader. 6 Specialized joinder devices for larger groups all arose in
equity: class actions, consolidation of actions, interpleader, and shareholder's
derivative suits.
69
61. See id. at 7-8.
62. Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1508
(1992).
63. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 433-54 (1986).
64. See Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL
L. REV. 270, 304-05 (1989).
65. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993).
66. 1 POMEROY, supra note 30, § 181, at 258; JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
PLEADINGS AND THE INCIDENTS THEREOF § 72, at 74 (10th ed. 1892) [hereinafter EQUITY PLEADINGS];
see Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1989) (Rubin, J., concurring).
67. 1 POMEROY, supra note 30, §§ 243-75, at 459-616; 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 64i, at 70-71 (13th ed. 1988)
[hereinafter EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE]; see also IRREPARABLE INJURY, supra note 3, at 74-75, 84 n.1, 86
nn.20-21.
68. See FED. R. CiV. P. 18-21, 24; 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. III 1991).
69. On the equitable origins of these devices, see EQUITY PLEADINGS, supra note 66, §§ 96-135b,
at 101-44 (class actions), § 287, at 284-85 n.a (consolidation), §§ 291-97b, at 286-94 (interpleader); Bert
S. Prunty, Jr., The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980 (1957).
For class action antecedents of derivative suits, see EQUITY PLEADINGS, supra note 66, §§ 108-09, at 117.
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Equity and common law procedure also differed fundamentally on
development of facts. There was no discovery at common law, so the bill of
discovery became a fertile source of equitable jurisdiction.' All of modem
discovery builds on that equitable base, although modem discovery rules now go
well beyond pre-merger practice. At common law, a party was not permitted to
testify either on his own initiative or in response to questions by the other
side.71 Equity disregarded the second half of that prohibition from the
beginning.
The great common law contribution to modern procedure is the jury trial.
Jury trial is enshrined in state and federal bills of rights, and while it has its
detractors, it also has vigorous defenders. Jury trial remains central to our
system of civil justice.72
But even here, equity has made its contribution. Subrin argues that the
federal rules shifted power from juries to judges in important ways.73 Bench
trial is a universally available alternative if the parties consent. Courts and
legislatures plainly believe that some cases are better tried without juries, and
they sometimes manipulate the line between law and equity to deny a jury trial
even when the parties do not consent. For example, courts and Congress have
agreed to treat back pay to victims of racial, sexual, or religious discrimination
as equitable restitution, not triable to a jury, originally for fear of jury
nullification in the race cases. 74 This rule was constitutionally dubious from the
beginning, and it becomes less tenable with every new Supreme Court decision
on the Seventh Amendment,75 but it is still the rule.76 Plaintiffs in disparate
treatment cases now have a choice-bench trial with monetary recovery limited
to back pay under Title VII, 77 or jury trial with compensatory and punitive
damages under section 1981 or 1981a.7" Beginning in 1964, and continuing
through the debates that produced the awkward compromise of 1991, Congress
70. EQurry JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 67, §§ 66-74, at 72-81; 2 id. §§ 689-91, at 1-3.
71. 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 575, at 804-08 (James H.
Chadbourn rev. 1979); 8 id. §§ 2217-18, at 168-73 (John T. McNaughton rev. 1961).
72. For the influence of legal and equitable modes of trial, see Richard L. Marcus, Completing
Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U.
PITT. L. REV. 725 (1989).
73. Subrin, supra note 58, at 924 n.79.
74. See, e.g., Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. Sch. Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 323-24 (5th Cir. 1970).
75. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990) (holding that
suit against union for back pay is a suit for damages); Woodell v. Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers
Local 71, 112 S. Ct. 494 (1991) (following Terry).
76. See Ramos v. Roche Products, Inc., 936 F.2d 43,49-50 (1st Cir. 1991) (refusing jury trial in Title
VII claim for back pay); Walton v. Cowin Equip. Co., 733 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (finding
constitutional right to jury trial in Title VII case), rev'd mem, 930 F.2d 923 (11th Cir. 1991); see also
Chauffeurs, 494 U.S. at 571-72 (holding issue open).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III 1991).
78. Id. §§ 1981, 1981a. Claims of race discrimination, and some claims of ethnic discrimination, may
be brought under § 1981 for full compensatory damages. Other discrimination claims, mostly those
involving sex, handicap, and religion, are bifurcated into a back pay claim under Title VII and a claim
for all other damages under § 1981a, with the § 1981a damages subject to limits that vary with the size
of the employer.
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treated equitable remedies for employment discrimination as preferred and
nearly automatic, and damages as extraordinary and subject to abuse. Fear of
jury nullification gave way to fear of ruinous verdicts, but the common theme is
mistrust of jurors and therefore of damage remedies.
The most important example of adjudication without juries is the vast
jurisdiction committed to administrative agencies. Like the early chancery court,
administrative agencies provide centralized adjudication that bypasses the
ordinary courts, and their procedure looks a lot like the chancellor's procedure.
Similarly, we have seen a vast expansion in the use of magistrates and alternative
dispute resolution, each of which resembles the assistant judge role that began
in equity with special masters. The awkward status of bankruptcy judges draws
on the same model.
79
This shift to alternate modes of adjudication is motivated by many
things--often by the desire for expertise in a particular subject matter, sometimes
by the desire to circumvent the separation of powers, sometimes by a view that
administrative adjudication will be cheaper than judicial adjudication, and, in the
federal system, by the desire to appoint judges without giving them life tenure.'
One argument for agencies was that they provided easier access to equity-style
remedies-that cease and desist orders were better than damages after the
fact.81 Avoidance of juries is only part of the motivation for committing matters
to administrative agencies, magistrates, alternative dispute resolution, or
bankruptcy judges. But once a matter is so committed, these alternative
tribunals exercise their freedom from constitutional jury trial requirements. Even
with respect to jury trial, a vast part of our adjudication follows the equity
model, and not the common law model.
IV
SUBSTANCE
Our substantive law is derived from common law, from equity, and from
statute. Maitland correctly observed that there is no pattern, that it is impossible
to generalize about the things that came from equity.' He also noted that the
most basic rights and legal concepts came from common law. When equity
imposed personal duties on fiduciaries, mortgagees, or sellers of land, it
presupposed legal rights of property and contract. Equity without common law,
Maitland said, would have been "a castle in the air."'  He was right. But the
79. Bankruptcy courts are neither Article III courts nor Article I courts. Rather, bankruptcy judges
serve as "adjuncts" to district courts, with resulting limits on their jurisdiction. See Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63-87 (1982) (plurality opinion); 28 U.S.C. §§ 151,157
(1988).
80. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 6-46 (1938); GLEN 0. ROBINSON ET
AL., THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 7-8 (3d ed. 1986).
81. ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 80, at 8.
82. 1 FREDERICK W. MAITLAND, EQurrY 1 (2d ed. 1936).
83. Id. at 19.
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other half of his comparison was equally right: Common law without equity
would have been a functioning system, but in many applications it would have
been "barbarous, unjust, absurd."'
It is hardly surprising that we have not abandoned equity and reverted to
barbarism. To the contrary, substantive equity is now fully integrated into our
substantive law, with or without continued consciousness of its equitable origins.
I will mention five of the more prominent examples.
First, the equitable law of trusts has displaced the cumbersome common law
of future interests-by statutory abolition in England and by the practice of all
competent lawyers in the United States.85 More important, the concept of
fiduciary duty has spread from express trusts to the whole range of principal-
agent relationships, and is influencing relationships traditionally thought to be
arm's-length, such as buyer-seller and debtor-creditor. Commercial adversaries
are occasionally held to be fiduciaries;' more generally, similar conceptions of
fairness inform the ever-growing duty of good faith and fair dealing.'
Second, the law of mortgages now pervades our credit-based economy. The
essential rules of foreclosure and redemption, dividing the property between the
creditor and the owner while protecting the interests of each, arose in equity.
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, codifying the law of security
interests in personal property, united rules derived from both the equitable rules
about mortgages and the common law rules about pledges.' The equitable
origins of modem foreclosure rules are still reflected in financial use of the word
"equity" to describe the. owner's interest in property over and above all
outstanding liens. But how many securities lawyers, to say nothing of securities
brokers, could tell you why common stock is called equity? The equitable origin
of these rules has become irrelevant.
Third, most modem real estate development depends on equity's creation of
the equitable servitude.89 The common law created easements, real covenants,
profits a prendre, and irrevocable licenses, but each of these was historically
subject to doctrinal limits that were sometimes crippling. Easements could not
be "in gross"; covenants were not enforceable against subsequent owners unless
they "ran with the land"; and so on. The problem with real covenants was part
of a larger problem of common law restrictions on assignment of rights. Much
84. Id.
85. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 443-48 (4th
ed. 1990).
86. See HELEN DAVIS CHAITMAN, THE LAW OF LENDER LIABILrY § 5.03, at 5-11 to 5-26, § 7.02,
at 7-9 to 7-32 (1990).
87. Id. 88 4.01-4.06, at 4-1 to 4-32.
88. For an introduction to the ancient distinctions, see GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY § 1.1, at 5-9 (1965).
89. This paragraph and the next are largely based on Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of
Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1982); Uriel Reichman, Toward
a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177 (1982); Michael F. Sturley, Easements in Gross,
96 LAW Q. REV. 557 (1980).
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of the modem law of assignment and transfer of intangibles is traditionally
credited to equity.90
The limits on easements, covenants, profits, and licenses made these devices
unequal to such tasks as creating condominiums or permanently enforceable
private subdivision restrictions. Equity largely solved the problem by making
servitudes enforceable against anyone with notice. This was a critical break-
through, but once the breakthrough was secure, the distinctions among the
various devices became progressively less important. All these devices have
expanded until they substantially overlap, but with technical distinctions that
create a state of hideous confusion in the formal rules. It now appears likely that
the American Law Institute will propose a single unified device for private
restrictions on land use, and that it will use the equitable label, servitude.91
The law of restitution is a fourth example of this integration. Restitution
arose partly in equity, through subrogation, constructive trust, equitable lien, and
the like, and partly at law, through quasi-contract and the common counts. Both
legal and equitable restitutionary devices expanded until they were largely
overlapping. This divided history dominates the Restatement of Restitution,
which is subtitled "Quasi Contracts and Constructive Trusts," and contains two
disconnected and sometimes redundant parts, drafted by two different reporters
but bound in a single cover.92
Quasi-contracts and constructive trusts were the principal restitutionary
devices at law and in equity, respectively. Each was and is a fiction for implying
a remedy or a cause of action; neither depends on a real contract or a real trust.
Either fiction can be made to fit in most contexts, and results should not depend
on the cleverness of the pleader. But a constructive trust generally results in a
preference over other creditors, while a quasi-contract does not. That is a real
choice, and we should focus our attention directly on when to award the
preference. We should not approach the preference question indirectly through
supposed limitations on the fictional logic of constructive trust or quasi-
contract.93 Here, as in so many other places, thinking in terms of categories
derived from law and equity simply distracts us from the real issues.
Some applications of restitution have become entrenched in modem doctrines
with names of their own. These largely independent bodies of restitution law
include the law of mistake,' the law of contribution and subrogation,95 and the
90. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS, supra note 88, § 7.3, at 202-03.
91. See Susan F. French, Servitudes Reform and the New Restatement of Property: Creation
Doctrines and Structural Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 928 (1988); Susan F. French, Design
Proposalfor the New Restatement of the Law of Property-Servitudes, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1213, 1231
(1988).
92. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION (1937). For further elaboration, see Douglas Laycock, The
Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1277, 1278-79 (1989).
93. For a start in this direction, see Emily L. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, 1989 U.
ILL. L. REv. 297.
94. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 6-69.
95. Id. §§ 76-102, 162.
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law of partly performed contracts.' The general adoption of contribution
among joint tortfeasors, and then of comparative negligence, has spawned a vast
body of law about the rights of defendants against each other and the effect of
a plaintiff's settlement with one defendant on her rights against other defen-
dants.7 We do not usually think of personal injury law as equitable, but nearly
all of this law is built on the equitable base of subrogation, contribution, and
indemnity."a Lawyers applying these doctrines may or may not know they are
dealing with restitution; and even if they do, they almost certainly have no idea
whether their patch of restitution came from law or equity. Conveniently
illustrating the point with the simplest of examples, a scholarly judge recently
misdescribed quasi-contract as "an equitable remedy."" But this obvious error
in an otherwise fine opinion was absolutely harmless, because the common-law
origins of quasi-contract were absolutely irrelevant to any issue presented.
Fifth, the equitable defenses are now generally available both at law and in
equity. Fraud"° and estoppel" l are unambiguously available in both legal
and equitable actions. Both the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts make unconscionability equally available at law and in
equity." Unclean hands has its legal counterpart, in pari delicto, I°3 and as
Chafee showed, a host of narrower doctrines serve the same purpose." You
might think that undue hardship, or balancing the equities, is surely just an
equitable defense, but this is not so. In the Restatement's formulation, damages
based on the cost of performing a contract will be denied if that cost is "clearly
disproportionate" to the benefit;1°5 specific performance will be denied if it
would impose "unreasonable hardship.""I  The cases use these and similar
phrases interchangeably."°
Other examples could be offered, but trusts, mortgages, servitudes,
restitution, and equitable defenses are five of the most important. In each case
96. Id. § 107-11; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 370-77 (1981).
97. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 50-51, at 336-45
(5th ed. 1984). For analysis of the incentives created by alternate rules, see In re Oil Spill by the Amoco
Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1314-18 (7th Cir. 1992); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing
Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L.J. 831 (1989).
98. On the equitable origins of these doctrines, see 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION § 1.5, at 20-29 (1978); 4 POMEROY, supra note 30, §§ 1416-19, at 1070-75; 1 EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 67, §§ 492-505, at 504-30.
99. In re De Laurentiis Entertainment Group Inc., 963 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir. 1992).
100. On equity's contribution to the law of fraud, see, e.g., 3 POMEROY, supra note 30, §§ 872-974a,
at 417-883; 1 EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 67, §§ 184-440, at 194-442.
101. On the equitable origins of estoppel, see 3 POMEROY, supra note 30, § 802, at 179-84; 1 EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 67, § 389, at 395; 2 id. §§ 1533-56, at 860-66.
102. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208.
103. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985); Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
104. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming Into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REv. 877 (1949);
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming Into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1065 (1949).
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(2)(b).
106. Id. § 364(1)(b).
107. See, e.g., 3615 Corp. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 717 F.2d 1236, 1238 (8th Cir. 1983); Van Wagner
Advertising Corp. v. S & M Enter., 492 N.E.2d 756, 761 (N.Y. 1986).
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the point is the same: Equitable doctrine is part of the warp and woof of our
substantive law. These doctrines should continue to develop in harmony with
related legal doctrines, and on the basis of sound policy in a modern democratic
society. I submit that no question concerning the scope or content of these
doctrines should any longer depend on whether they historically arose in law or
equity. The substantive rules that govern our behavior should not depend on the
historical jurisdiction of ancient courts that were merged fifty-five or one
hundred forty-five years ago."
V
DISCRETION
The most general distinction between law and equity in the early days was
in the attitudes of the two systems toward formalism and discretion. Law was
formal and rigid; equity was flexible, discretionary-a court of conscience. This
distinction draws on the equity courts' self-description, and on Aristotle's
conception of equity as a source of "correction of law where it is defective owing
to its universality." 1°9
I suspect that this historical stereotype is exaggerated, because we also say
that the genius of the common law was in its flexible stability and its capacity for
growth within a tradition. Patrick Atiyah has described how England in the
nineteenth century experienced a relative disappearance of discretion in both the
law courts and the equity courts, followed by a resurgence of discretion in the
merged courts in the twentieth century.110
Whatever the historical reality, it is clear that discretion has largely
triumphed in the modern legal sensibility. Discretion is everywhere; "formalist,"
"formalism," and the like are epithets, even in the word processors of the most
conservative judges."' Surely there is no one who thinks that discretion of the
sort traditionally associated with equity is confined to cases that would have been
filed in equity before the merger. If you do not agree that this point is too
108. Law and equity were merged in the federal courts in 1938 by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. FLEMING JAMES, JR., ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.8, at 22 (4th ed. 1992). The first state
to merge law and equity was New York, in the Field Code of 1848. Id. § 1.7, at 19.
109. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics 1137b, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1796
(Jonathan Barnes, ed. & W. D. Ross, trans., 1984).
110. Patrick S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial
Process and the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1251-59 (1980).
111. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992) (opinion of the Court by Kennedy, J.)
(rejecting dissent's argument as "formalistic in the extreme"); Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1449
(1992) (opinion of the Court by Kennedy, J.) ("The law is not so formalistic."); Business Elec. Corp. v.
Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) (opinion of the Court by Scalia, J.) (announcing
"presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason standard," and that exceptions "must be justified by
demonstrable economic effect .... rather than formalistic distinctions"); id. at 728 ("Such formalism was
explicitly rejected."); United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,218 n.9
(1984) (opinion of the Court by Rehnquist, J.)("Such a formalistic construction would effectively write
the Clause out of the Constitution."); id. at 220 n.10 (criticizing "the dissent's formalistic approach").
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obvious to require proof it would take a much longer article than I intend to
write to convince you."'
I will confine myself to a single striking illustration, which I largely owe to
the late Edward Yorio. Courts sometimes say that specific performance is a
discretionary remedy, and that some contracts are too unfair to be specifically
enforced, even though they may not be too unfair to support an award of
damages. This never made sense to me. The economic burden to defendant of
expectancy damages will be at least as great as the economic burden of specific
performance. If consequential damages could be avoided by specific perfor-
mance, the burden of expectancy damages will be greater than the burden of
specific performance. So if courts have the power to set aside unfair contracts,
they should set aside the whole contract and not just the remedy of specific
performance." 3 Or so I once believed.
Yorio's insight was that the successful plaintiff on an unfair contract will not
necessarily recover his full expectancy." 4 To elaborate his point and modify
it slightly, a great deal of discretion is built into the measure of damages. The
court might find the consequential damages too remote or uncertain. It might
find the expectancy too uncertain and award reliance damages instead. It might
hold down the damages by accepting the defendant's estimate on all valuation
questions. It might rely on the jury to nullify the expectancy of overreaching
plaintiffs. In general, the amount of damages is variable, sometimes continuously
variable. A court can shave the damages without having to acknowledge that its
reason for doing so is that it disapproves of the contract.
These techniques of compromise are relatively unavailable with a specific
performance decree. Specific performance is generally all-or-nothing, full
performance or no relief. Specific performance can be conditioned on a price
adjustment or some other concession, but this is rare, and the doctrinal reason
would usually have to be some open holding of unconscionability or overreach-
ing. The result is that specific performance cases are full of talk about
conscience and discretion, overtly introducing the discretion that is inherent in
the more flexible process of measuring damages.
Candor is among the highest judicial virtues; courts should not conceal
unconscionability holdings in compromise damage judgments. The point here is
not whether judges should act this way, but simply that they do. There are ways
in which damage remedies are more flexible than equitable remedies, and
112. Chancellor Allen does make the narrower claim that in Delaware's unmerged courts, discretion
and a concern for justice in individual cases appear "to a much greater extent" in the equity courts than
in the law courts. Chancellor William T. Allen, Speculations on the Bicentennial: What Is Distinctive
About Our Court of Chancery?, in COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 1792-1992, at
13 (1992). I am skeptical about the magnitude of this difference, but I am no expert on Delaware, and
I defer to Chancellor Allen's judgment and experience. Certainly it is possible that separate courts
would develop separate traditions. It is much more difficult to imagine judges in merged courts behaving
in one way in cases that would have been at law before the judges were born, and in a fundamentally
different way in cases that would have been in equity before the judges were born.
113. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 381 (1985).
114. See Edward Yorio, A Defense of Equitable Defenses, 51 OHIO ST. LI. 1201 (1990).
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modem judges take advantage of that flexibility. A common-law remedy that
is more flexible and more discretionary than its equitable alternative is a
powerful example of my point: Discretion and flexibility pervade the system and
are not limited to the historic confines of equity.
VI
FUTURE DEBATES, OR, Is THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AIMED AT EQUITY?
Some of our law is controversial, and some of what is controversial has roots
in equity. Formalism has its virtues and its defenders, at least up to a point.115
There is a clear turn to formalism in the Supreme Court, especially with respect
to statutory interpretation.
1 6
In some contexts, I am among the defenders of greater formalism. I have
argued for greater attention to the text of statutes and constitutions;1" I have
denied that judges have discretion to pick and choose which rights to en-
force.118 I have argued that both legal and equitable remedies should be tied
to the standard of restoring plaintiff to the position she would have occupied but
for the wrong; I have denied that a court of equity has a roving commission to
do good once it identifies a threshold violation of law that justifies its interven-
tion.119 The inability to convincingly tie constitutional remedies to constitution-
al rights has undermined the legitimacy of judicial efforts, and may have under-
mined support for the underlying constitutional rights. On the other hand, I
have defended balancing as essential to constitutional adjudication, 120 and Doug
Rendleman thinks I rely too much on balancing in choosing remedies.1 21
Different kinds of legal problems require different legal methods. Formal rules
are generally inadequate for complex choices among competing factors; balancing
tests are generally inadequate to limit the power of decisionmakers. It is entirely
115. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988).
116. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., No Final Victories: The Incompleteness of Equity's Triumph in Federal
Public Law, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (Summer 1993), and articles cited therein.
117. Douglas Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review, 59 TEX. L. REV.
343 (1981)(book review).
118. Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial Review, the Expansion of Federal Power, and
the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 YALE L.J. 1711, 1745 (1990)(book review).
119. See LAYCOCK, supra note 113, at 234-81, 318-19. For a conclusory but more explicit statement,
see Laycock, supra note 118, at 1730 n.108.
120. Laycock, supra note 118, at 1744-47; Douglas Laycock, The Ultimate Unity of Rights and Utilities,
64 TEx. L. REV. 407 (1985).
121. Doug Rendleman, Irreparability Irreparably Damaged, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 1642, 1654-55 (1992)
(book review). Rendleman says that if my book were in a database, he would "count all the times the
words balance, balancing, weigh, and outweigh are used." Id. at 1654 n.47. I still have the book on disk;
the answer is 96 times, including quotations and other people's titles, in 374 pages. If we throw in all
other forms and tenses of the two words, including weight of authority, weight loss programs, truck
weight limits, and makeweight arguments, we get 129 times. Most of these uses of the words are
describing my assessment of what some court or courts actually did in a case or group of cases. But
Rendleman does not mischaracterize my own views; I think that balancing interests is generally the right
approach to deciding whether to override plaintiff's choice of remedy.
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possible to have an excess of discretion, just as the common law once had an
excess of formalism.
Stephen Subrin's article on the procedural triumph of equity argues that the
triumph has gone much too far, and that the current complaints about litigation
delay are the complaints one should expect from a procedural system that has
entirely abandoned the common law's attempt to focus litigation on discrete
issues.122 He does not propose a return to common-law pleading, but he does
urge a better balance. More generally, there is a reaction against the litigation
system, reflected in proposals for tort reform and procedural reform."2 I have
already noted the retreat from notice pleading;124 more generally, my colleague
Linda Mullenix has shown that the Civil Justice Reform Act dramatically amends
the Rules Enabling Act and threatens havoc on the various Federal Rules of
Procedure."2  Command-and-control regulation by administrative agencies is
under attack in favor of fees, charges, and financial incentives that create
markets.126 This can be fairly characterized as a shift from specific relief to
monetary relief, although here I think the real objection is to the difficulties
inherent in economic central planning when agencies try to control whole
industries, or even the whole economy in the case of environmental regulation.
This objection has only attenuated relevance to problems of corrective justice
arising out of single transactions.
Some of these reform proposals seem to me sensible; some seem ill-disguised
attempts to reduce enforcement of certain rights that are unpopular with one or
another political faction. We will have to fight these issues out, seeking a
122. Subrin, supra note 58, at 975-1002.
123. See, e.g., BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAYS IN
CIVIL LITIGATION (1990); AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA: A REPORT FROM THE
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS (1991); COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE (1991). For commentary, see, e.g., PETER W. HUBER & ROBERT E. LITAN, THE LIABILITY
MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION (1991); PETER W. HUBER,
LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988); Deborah R. Hensler, Taking
Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on Competitiveness's Agenda for Legal Reform, 75
JUDICATURE 244 (1992); Gregory B. Butler & Brian D. Miller, Fiddling While Rome Burns: A Response
to Dr. Hensler, 75 JUDICATURE 251 (1992); Symposium: Issues in Tort Reform, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 317
(1987); Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Time Again for
Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155 (1991); Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United": The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,
54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (Summer 1991).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
125. Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992);
Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers,
77 MINN. L. REV. 1283 (1993). The Civil Justice Reform Act is Title I of the Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (Supp. III 1991). 1 am not persuaded that the act is
unconstitutional, but I am persuaded that it is a counterrevolution. For a more sympathetic account,
agreeing that the Act has produced serious problems but suggesting that they have arisen more through
flawed implementation than in the original conception, see Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Civil Justice
Reform Act, 30 HARV. J. LEGIS. 115 (1993); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of
Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393 (1992).
126. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 156-83 (1982); CHARLES L.
SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF THE PRIVATE INTEREST (1977).
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sensible balance between discretion and formalism, as well as between plaintiffs
and defendants. I raise these issues not to propose a resolution, but to ask
whether a distinction between law and equity would contribute to their
resolution. I am confident that it would not.
We can argue about the right balance between discretion and formalism, but
it makes no sense to argue about the right balance between law and equity. If
discretion pervades the system, then discretion is no longer equitable in any
meaningful sense. If we have too much discretion in the system, we have too
much discretion in equitable contexts as well as in legal contexts.
The attack on the litigation system is aimed at least as much at features
derived from law as at those derived from equity. The entire tort reform
movement is aimed at common-law damage actions and the discretionary power
of juries. But the jury is the most prominent procedural survivor from common
law, and damages are the quintessential legal remedy.
The view that damages are the more intrusive and troublesome remedy is
also widespread in public law. The Supreme Court's immunity rules sharply limit
damage suits against public officials but impose little constraint on injunction
suits.127 Some conservative justices have dissented bitterly from the Court's
decision to imply damage remedies to enforce the Constitution." But Chief
Justice Rehnquist has acknowledged that courts can imply equitable remedies to
enforce the Constitution. 129  The new conservative majority has allowed
Congress to sharply limit constitutional remedies,1" and the most common
statutory limitation is to provide remedies without damages or with sharply
limited compensation."'
In the related area of implied rights to enforce federal statutes, the Court has
also refused to distinguish damages from injunctions.13 2  But what is most
revealing here is that the governmental defendants, supported by the United
States as amicus curiae, argued that the implied right of action should be limited
to prospective relief and back pay, and that damages should be precluded. Faced
with the defendants' explicit fear of the damage remedy, part of the Court's
opinion was nonresponsive to the point of incomprehension:
First, both [the prospective and back pay] remedies are equitable in nature, and
it is axiomatic that a court should determine the adequacy of a remedy in law
before resorting to equitable relief. Under the ordinary convention, the proper
127. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-71 (1974).
128. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 31-54 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
129. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
130. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) ("meaningful" but incomplete remedy specified
by Congress precludes implied right to sue for consequential damages).
131. See id. at 415-17, 425-26, 428 (allowing back benefits and procedural reforms, but not
consequential damages, for revocation of disability benefits without due process); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
367, 371-73 (1983) (allowing reinstatement with back pay, but not damages for mental suffering, punitive
damages, jury trial, or attorneys' fees, for discharge of federal employee in violation of first amendment).
132. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
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inquiry would be whether monetary damages provided an adequate remedy, and
if not, whether equitable relief would be appropriate."
This reference to the remedial hierarchy was totally irrelevant to the
defendants' argument. It was also totally irrelevant to the statute before the
Court, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.1' If damages were
really the "ordinary" remedy, the issue before the Court could not have arisen.
Twenty years after the statute was enacted, and thirteen years after the Supreme
Court held that private plaintiffs could sue to enforce it,135 it was still an open
question whether damages could be awarded at all. The court of appeals had
held that the injunction and back pay remedies were exclusive.136 Obviously,
damages had not been preferred, ordinary, or routine.
Some limitations on federal remedies-most notably the Younger rules that
limit federal interference with state judicial proceedings137-were initially
justified as limitations on equity. But equity rhetoric was de-emphasized early
in the evolution of the Younger doctrine.13 More important, the equity
rationale has been abandoned whenever it mattered; these limitations on federal
relief apply to declaratory judgments and damage actions and not just to
traditional equitable remedies.139 The expansion to legal remedies makes
sense, because these are rules about federalism, not rules about equity. The
Younger episode is simply the most recent repetition of a cycle, in which
arguments about the extraordinary and subordinate status of equity are used to
bolster or disguise new arguments about federalism or separation of powers."
The equity talk is abandoned when the new arguments are sufficiently
established to stand on their own.
On the left, we find the civil rights movement appealing to equitable
discretion to fashion expansive remedies. At the same time, it urges special
procedural rules for civil rights cases-rejecting trans-substantive procedure and
133. Id. at 1038.
134. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1988).
135. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
136. 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990). Defendant's fear of damages also got a sympathetic response
from Justices Scalia and Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, who nevertheless concurred in the
judgment because they found express statutory authority for damages. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1038-39.
137. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
138. See Aviam Soifer & Hugh C. Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction,
55 TEx. L. REV. 1141, 1178-1213 (1977).
139. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (declaratory judgment); cf. Fair Assessment in Real
Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 113-17 (1982) (policy of Tax Injunction Act also precludes suits
for damages caused by unconstitutional administration of state tax laws). Whether Younger itself applies
to damage actions was reserved in Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193 (1988). The plaintiff's damage
claim in Deakins could proceed in federal court even under Younger, because the claim could not be
asserted in state court in the pending criminal prosecution. Id. at 202, 204. The plaintiff agreed to stay
the damage claim until the criminal prosecution was concluded. Id. at 201-02. The Court referred to
this stay as "the comity bargain," plainly implying that it viewed Younger's policies as relevant and
applicable. Id. at 203.
140. See IRREPARABLE INJURY, supra note 3, at 133-59.
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implying the beginnings of a new writ system.141 If we think of these argu-
ments in terms of law and equity, the civil rights movement is contradicting itself.
It wants equitable remedies and legal procedure. But why should we think of
it in terms of law and equity? The sensible approach is to consider each
proposal on its merits. Both, neither, one, or the other of these proposals may
make sense. But nothing could be less relevant than the proposals' similarity to
the remedies or procedures of certain courts that had a separate existence in the
last century.
The argument over discretionary remedies is revealing in another way as well.
Many judges and commentators say that the remedy need not be connected in
any logical way to the substantive violation.142  The essence of this claim,
although it is rarely stated so baldly, is that equity can remedy harms that were
not caused by any violation of law. I think this view is mistaken, and that it
embodies too much sense of discretion with respect to equitable remedies. The
Supreme Court has occasionally said SO.14 3
Think about the argument on this question, first assuming that you agree with
me, and then assuming that you disagree. Suppose you want to limit excessive
claims of equitable discretion. The solution is not to confine the scope of equity,
but rather to confine the discretion within equity. The solution is not to
highlight the distinction between law and equity, but rather to highlight the unity
of the concept of remedy. Whether at law or in equity, the basic problem of
corrective justice is the same, and similar questions arise about causation,
proximity, and rightful position. Specific relief should be generally available for
proven harms, but specific relief should not be an occasion for a court to remedy
harms that it would not compensate with the equivalent damage remedy. If a
harm is not sufficiently connected to the wrong to justify submitting a damage
issue to the jury, it is hard to see how it justifies an injunction. But if there is a
functional reason to reach further with injunctions than with damages, the
proponents of such relief should state that reason explicitly. Maybe the reason
is distrust of juries; maybe the reason is that we should go further to prevent
harm that is still preventable than to compensate harm that has already been
suffered or become inevitable. These hypotheses are worthy of debate, but we
should debate them explicitly. We should not obscure their merits or demerits
with a fog of rhetoric about the traditional discretion of equity.
Now suppose that you want to defend remedial discretion disconnected from
substantive violations. Or suppose that you are-defending some other feature of
present law, or proposing some extension, that draws support from equi-
141. The most dramatic example is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (Supp. III 1991), enacting special rules
of compulsory joinder, intervention, and res judicata for affirmative action cases. For a sympathetic
analysis of this provision, see Susan S. Grover, The Silenced Majority: Martin v. Wilks and the Legislative
Response, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 43.
142. The classic citation is Chayes, supra, note *, at 1293-94, 1298-1302.
143. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
738 (1974).
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ty-specific performance, or notice pleading and liberal joinder rules, or
discretion to take account of the special needs of the weaker party to the lawsuit.
From this strategic posture as well it would be wise to abandon reliance on
any strong distinction between law and equity. If you emphasize the separate
traditions of equity, then like it or not, you emphasize the separateness and
specialness of equity. If equity is something extraordinary, then whatever lessons
you choose to draw from it are also extraordinary, confined to special situations.
Those who would draw on the traditions of equity would do well to emphasize
the pervasiveness and ordinariness of those traditions, but most important, they
should emphasize the good sense of those traditions. It should be sufficient to
persuade the court that it is a good idea, and within the judicial power, to
prevent harm beyond the limits of causation and proximity that apply to
compensation. If something that originated in equity makes sense, we are free
to use it; we should not have to ask whether this is an appropriate occasion for
equity. That is the meaning of the merger of law and equity, and that is the
reality of our existing legal system.
If you think of discretion as the essence of equity, then any attack on
discretion is an attack on equity. But the attack on discretion is by no means
limited to equity, or even directed primarily at equity. Discretion now pervades
the legal system, and we are in a new round of the endless debate over how
much discretion and in what contexts. Talk of law and equity can only muddle
that debate.
VII
EQUITY AS A PROXY
In the previous section, I considered the assumption that the attack on
arguably excessive discretion is an attack on equity. This assumption is an
example of a more general phenomenon: use of the law-equity distinction as a
dysfunctional proxy for a series of functional choices. Before the merger, the
choice between equity and law entailed an all-or-nothing choice between all the
characteristics of each system: discretion or formalism, specific or substitutionary
remedies, personal decrees or impersonal judgments, enforcement by the
contempt power or by execution and garnishment, bench trial or jury trial, and
the availability or unavailability of preliminary relief.
The merger of law and equity ought to mean that the choice between law
and equity is no longer all-or-nothing. In a merged system, these functional
choices can be unbundled and considered independently. If we want specific
relief without the contempt power or discretion without bench trial, we ought to
be able to have it. This unbundling of choices has happened, both before and
after the merger, in cases where the need was greatest. That is, courts and
legislatures found ways to use equitable features on the law side and legal
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features on the equity side.1" But we have not unbundled these choices
conceptually; most lawyers and legal academics still assume that if you choose
equity, you must inevitably get the full list of characteristics traditionally
associated with equity.
This use of equity as a proxy is the key to my limited disagreement with
Doug Rendleman. Rendleman agrees that the irreparable injury rule is at most
in a state of "nominal survival," 45 but he worries that I am too casual about
the special dangers of injunctions.'" The power to issue injunctions and then
enforce them with coercive contempt enables the trial judge to find the facts,
make the law, interpret the law thus made, adjudge violations, and imprison
.defendants indefinitely to compel compliance. No jury is required; the
combination of judicial delay and the collateral bar rule may make appellate
review ineffective; 47 and appellate review may be deferential on key issues in
any event. When these rules are applied to a structural injunction designed to
reform a large institution, the concentration of government power in a single
human being is extraordinary."
Rendleman is not the first to note the potential for abuse in the current rules
governing contempt,'49 and I do not disagree with these assessments. I do deny
that these dangers are reasons for treating equity as extraordinary. That is the
fallacy of equity as proxy-all of equity should be limited because, in the last
extreme, the method of enforcing equitable decrees is susceptible to abuse.
If the contempt power is susceptible to abuse, we should devise additional
limits or safeguards on the contempt power. Many such limits are already in
place15° or in the process of case-law development,' and others could easily
be drafted. Any legislature or supreme court could repeal or limit the collateral
bar rule in its jurisdiction, or require that contempt proceedings be heard by a
judge other than the one who entered the injunction. These reforms can be
144. See IRREPARABLE INJURY, supra note 3, at 11-16, 29-30 nn.27-43 (discussing the use of equity
as a proxy and collecting examples of legal features in equity and equitable features at law).
145. Rendleman, supra note 121, at 1666. He takes the phrase from MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE
NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 118 (1988).
146. Rendleman, supra note 121, at 1652, 1671.
147. The most famous example is Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
148. See, e.g., United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied in part, 489
U.S. 1065 (1989), rev'd in part as Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990).
149. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils SA, 481 U.S. 787, 815-25 (1987) (Scalia,
J., concurring); John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEx. L. REV. 579, 620-27 (1984).
150. See United States v. Dixon, No. 91-1231, 1993 WL 224417 (U.S., June 28, 1993); Bloom v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (requiring jury trial before sentence of more than six months for criminal
contempt); 18 U.S.C. § 1826 (1988) (limiting coercive imprisonment of recalcitrant witnesses to 18
months); 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988) (limiting bases for judgment of contempt); FED. R. CIV. P. 70
(authorizing courts to direct willing third parties to perform acts on behalf of unwilling defendants, thus
eliminating the need to coerce compliance).
151. See, e.g., Bagwell v. United Mine Workers, 423 S.E.2d 349 (Va. 1992) (refusing to apply
protections of criminal procedure to collection of coercive civil contempt fines), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W.
3799 (June 1, 1993); Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that coercive
imprisonment cannot continue if there is no substantial likelihood that contemnor will succumb to
coercion).
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debated on their merits. My point here is simply that if our goal is to limit abuse
of the contempt power, it is far better to limit the contempt power than to limit
the scope of equity.
Rendleman seems to accept this point,'52 and is willing to abandon the
irreparable injury rule,'53 but he still believes that "the injunction requires
special handling through principles of containment."'54 Dan Dobbs hints at a
similar view.15 5 What is left unclear is whether they think that principles of
containment aimed at the contempt power should limit or contain the occasions
for issuing injunctions in the first place. That sort of front-end containment
would repeat the error of the irreparable injury rule; it would use equity as a
proxy for the worst features of contempt.
We should not deny specific or preliminary relief or other features associated
with equity to avoid facing up to the dangers of abuse in the contempt power.
Abuse of the contempt power is a problem only in some fraction of those few
cases in which the defendant litigates to judgment, loses on the merits, and
remains persistently unable or unwilling to comply. Litigants would suffer out
of all proportion to any benefits if we seriously limited equitable relief in all
cases to avoid judicial abuse in these few cases. A more modest limit on initial
issuance of injunctions would not reduce abuse of the contempt power at all. A
judge inclined to abuse his power would not be restrained by so gossamer a
restriction as the irreparable injury rule, even if that rule retained some life, or
by any likely substitute formulation. To treat injunctions as special is wholly
illusory as a protection against abuse of the contempt power.
There is also a quaint unreality to the view that injunctions are a remedy
especially prone to abuse. There is a full-scale political and legal battle over
alleged abuses in damage awards.156  There is no remotely comparable battle
over abuses of injunctions or the contempt power. The class of repeat
defendants is saying loud and clear that it fears excessive damages far more than
it fears excessive injunctions or excessive contempt sanctions. If we were to
create a remedial hierarchy based on the risk of abuse, injunctions should be
preferred and damages extraordinary. But the solution is not a remedial
hierarchy in either direction. The solution is to respond to abuses in either
remedy.
152. Rendleman, supra note 121, at 1665 ("we should examine principles of containment directly
instead of filtering them through distorting cliches").
153. Id. at 1653.
154. Id. at 1651.
155. Pessimists doubt the benignant use of power and may mistrust those who favor
coercion when other solutions are available. Balancing of equities, hardships, and
practicalities, supplemented by a few more particular rules, might suffice. But the
critical weight in the balance may turn out to be the weight of one's attitude about
coercion and its intrusive effects. The adequacy test can be discarded, but a pessimistic
presumption that disfavors coercion may prove to be a more difficult matter.
1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.5(3), at 142 (1993) (citation omitted). A similar point appears
in James S. Hirschhorn, Book Review, 22 SETON HALL L. REv. 297, 306 (1991).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 123-36.
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VIII
CONCLUSION
Equity has triumphed in the sense that most of its innovations are now
accepted parts of our law. They are not necessarily uncontroversial in all their
applications and extensions; lawyers and judges will continue to argue over many
of these issues. But in most of these disputes, equitable innovations have been
carried well beyond what either common law or equity was doing before the
merger, and no foreseeable retrenchment is likely to change that. The current
line of battle is far beyond the pre-merger line.
My more basic point is that these debates are no longer about law and
equity; they are simply debates about our law. We should not view every
incremental expansion of a feature once associated with common law or equity
as an incremental victory for common law or equity. The one thing we may be
sure of is that the legal or equitable origin of the feature does not motivate the
decision. Equity is fully accepted; legal and equitable features compete on a
level playing field, largely commingled and sometimes indistinguishable. The
argument about law and equity is over; now we just argue what the rules ought
to be on grounds that are substantive, political, or jurisprudential, but not on the
ground of the subordinate status of equity.
One practical implication of this view is that legislatures should quit enacting
references to law and equity, and they should eliminate existing references where
possible. Because the historic boundary between law and equity was not
functional, it rarely captures any sensible distinction the legislature might want
to draw. Equally important, judges and lawyers no longer understand what such
references mean. The Supreme Court recently provided an unusually clear
example.
The Court split five to four on the meaning of "equitable relief" in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act.'57 The majority assumed that
Congress used the phrase loosely: "As memories of the divided bench, and
familiarity with its technical refinements, recede further into the past, [it]
becomes increasingly unlikely" that Congress used "equitable relief" to mean
"whatever relief a court of equity is empowered to provide in the particular case
at issue. '  The Court thought it more likely that the phrase described "those
categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunction,
mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages)."1 9 Part of the
irony here is that the Court did not even get its loose usage right, because
mandamus and much of restitution was legal."6 But what is most striking is
157. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 61 U.S.L.W. 4510 (June 1, 1993) (construing 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(3) (1988)).
158. Id. at 4513.
159. Id.
160. THEODORE F.T. PLucKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 173 (5th ed. 1956)
(describing origins of mandamus in Court of King's Bench); see supra text accompanying notes 92-99
(summarizing origins of restitution).
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the express assumption that Congress used a technical term inaccurately because
lawyers no longer know what it means.
Another practical implication of accepting my view of the matter is that it
would discredit one recurring argument that can only confuse and never
enlighten-the argument that something cannot be done because it comes from
equity, and equity is extraordinary or subordinate to law. It is a safe generaliza-
tion that whenever a judge or an advocate relies on the claim that equity is
extraordinary, he is padding his real argument with a makeweight. Consciously
or not, he has some fear that his real argument may not persuade and that he
needs to flim flam the gullible. He may be among the gullible himself, and he
may be fooling himself. But I am quite certain that neither the history of equity
nor a consistent remedial hierarchy is the reason for his decision. Except where
references to equity have been codified, as in the constitutional arguments about
jury trial, law-equity arguments are always and exclusively a misleading
distraction.
